Multilateral Nuclear stability Research Summary
This is a research based on Multilateral Nuclear stability and how the Prisoners Dilemma plays the role for countries such as China and Pakistan. So the focus is on China and Pakistan their history what treaty they have signed and what capabilities can they have in regards GDP I need factors and most important critics about why they pull out of the nuclear treaty with other countries. I will upload all the ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES I HAVE SO BASED ON THAT YOU CAN SUMMARIZE EVERYTHING. This is research for the Department of State. I will also upload the research proposal so you can have an idea about the questions and what we are looking for in this summary you can use the sources I have already have but if you are able to find other ones it will help a lot as well. GO-based on the RESEARCH PROPOSAL USE THAT AS WELL TO ANSWER THE QUESTION ON THE PROPOSAL.
Research Proposal
Topic: (SR) Assessing the potential of game theory to make significant contributions to analyzing multilateral nuclear stability.
Description: (SR) This paper is an evaluation of game theory in specific regard to its ability to be of use in simulating possibilities that lead to multilateral nuclear stability. Our research seeks to establish primarily whether game theory can be of actual use for this topic. This paper will cover whether insightful multilateral nuclear stability games are possible, to which multilateral strategic stability problems can game theory analysis be applied, and which unique set of issues or challenges would need to be addressed in such multilateral games. Through answering these questions, the matter of understanding player motivations, compliance scenarios, and the potential for cheating will also become clearer.
Intended Audience: (SR) The State Department is the intended audience of this paper. Other audiences of interest range from the Department of Defense, CIA, and perhaps even the members of NATO. Since this topic is more concerned with exploring possibilities through game theory, the findings are better used with diplomatic intent and may offer outcomes or options to consider when evaluating multilateral nuclear stability on bilateral and unilateral levels. Additionally, since nuclear stability is a concern for the general public, the general public may be curious about these findings as well.
Primary Question: To what extent can multilateral nuclear stability be evaluated through several factors such as and is there a criteria that would help shape game theory?
Secondary Questions
1. To which multilateral strategic stability problems can game theory analysis be applied?
2. Which unique set of issues or challenges would need to be addressed in such multilateral games?
3. How would such a game be validated and how would the results be presented?
Method: To best understand the topic, the team will be looking at publications such as journal articles, books, current policies, prior and current treaties and agreements, as well as government releases regarding nuclear capabilities and policies. In essence, this approach will provide a baseline upon which the team will be able to construct criterias that shape the options that players will be able to make in potential games. These criterias will also be accompanied by a list of factors to take into consideration, irregardless of the assumptions that game theory makes. Upon the creation of this list, the team will reach out to other researchers and field experts to evaluate whether or not game theory can be applied on a multilateral level as influenced by the criterias and factors found by the group.
Purpose: The primary purpose of this research is to identify the possibility and potential of game theory when analyzing multilateral nuclear stability. While game theory has been used before during the bilateral nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, our research will focus on attributing game theory to fit the needs of multipolar world in which multiple actors have access to nuclear weapons. Further, we seek to confirm if game theory is applicable in determining nuclear stability as a whole.
Personal Interest: Nuclear weapons have the unique capability of destroying entire cities and killing thousands of people in a moment’s time. The use of nuclear weapons is a grave threat to our society and to the advancements the human race has been able to accomplish. Game theory can serve to help us understand the motivations, actions and potential future actions by international actors that have nuclear weapons at their disposal. If we can understand other actors and their potential actions, we stand a much better chance at preventing all out nuclear war.
Distribution of Labor: The research plan entails that each researcher be proficient in their choice of two countries that currently possess nuclear capability. In doing so, knowledge of nuclear actors and their capabilities and limitations will be gathered. This knowledge can then influence a list of criteria and factors to take into account when constructing multilateral nuclear games. Finally, assessing the criterion and factors to take into account will determine both the design of games, and the extent to which games can produce actual feasible outcomes.
Annotated Bibliography: Multilateral Nuclear Stability
Willner-Giwerc, M. (2018). Game Theory and Disarmament: Thinking Beyond the Table. Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info/2018/12/18/game-theory-and-disarmament-thinking-beyond-the-table/
The journal article gives an in-depth relationship between game theory and disarmament and how the importance of solving the increased tensions as a result of nuclear weapon acquisition. In addition, it addresses the difficult decisions that the decision-makers and especially the world leaders must make to change and save the lives of citizens which are at stake. With the increased nuclear acquisition, these decisions are often hard to make and requires creative and critical thinking because any mistake and miscalculation would lead to catastrophes and security issues. Game theory involves mathematical modeling of situations where parties make decisions and suggestions that would impact on one another. It helps in the creation of models that explain why an agent makes a particular decision and adopts a specific strategy. The players in a game theory often get rewards known as the payoff for every action they make and strategy they adopt. There are basic games that can be applied to solve the multilateral stability problem such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the Stag Hunt.
It is possible to use the game theory to solve the multilateral stability issues because both the parties will benefit from the payoffs. The basic games can be used to create disarmament models for countries during this era of nuclear weapon intensification. Using the prisoner’s dilemma, an arms race model can be created for two countries which share some values such as both prefer to hold more weapons, both are afraid of being the state with fewer weapons, and both prefer being less armed than more armed due to the cost of firearms. Thus, when both the countries share the values, they would acquire more weapons creating the less desirable outcome of an increase in weapons. However, the use of a Stag Hunt is a more appropriate model for disarmament because both the parties mutually accept that disarming is more desirable than arming. In a Stag Hunt, the involved parties work for a common good, they believe in communication and credibility as the most critical factors that can lead to a solution.
It is imperative for the world leaders to engage in Stag Hunt game, where they work together towards reducing nuclear weapon acquisition rather than staying in a dilemma only to increase weapon acquisition because of lack of information about the other party. The most challenging part in the multilateral games is the issue of trust and credibility; otherwise, if the political leaders have the interest of their citizens at heart, this should not be a problem.
Abdalzaher, Mohamed S., Karim Seddik, Maha Elsabrouty, Osamu Muta, Hiroshi Furukawa,
and Adel Abdel-Rahman. “Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey.” Sensors (14248220) 16, no. 7 (July 2016): 1003. http://www.165.193.178.96/login?url=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ebscohost.com%2flogin.aspx%3fdirect%3dtrue%26db%3dedb%26AN%3d120482414%26site%3deds-live.
The authors are involved in a study aimed at using game theory in establishing effective protection measures targeting wireless sensor networks (WSNs) from malicious activities and selfish behavior that might be a threat to nuclear stability on the international platforms. According to the authors, the success of game theory lies in its ability to capture the behaviors of actors before a crisis can develop and decrease the possibility, that behavior will be directed towards undesirable behavior. The process involves the identification of the main factors that can be used in monitoring real time with the objective of determining preferences that are independent of observed behavior.
From the approaches to game theory integrated by the authors it is evident that the process of establishing some form of nuclear stability will depend on the ability of the concerned parties to negotiate a settlement will keep track of the conflicting perceptions that they may have of each other. This process will be defined by ensuring that the parties do not show the willingness to negotiate to limit the possibility of being exploited by the other party. However, establishing operational trust can be effective in eliminating, deadlocks, and increasing the possibility that the concerned parties will have a common understanding.
The article will be critical to the research because it assesses the contribution of different game theoretic defense strategies when addressing existing security issues on the international platform. Through this approach, it is possible to assess the contributions of both the attacker and the defenders in ensuring that the resulting decision benefits both parties. The article also identifies that significant role of the evolutionary games for security against intelligent attacks and other prospects or applying game theory to improve trust.
Rao, Nageswara S. V., Stephen W. Poole, Chris Y. T. Ma, Fei He, Jun Zhuang, and David K. Y.
Yau. “Defense of Cyber Infrastructures Against Cyber-Physical Attacks Using Game-Theoretic Models.” Risk Analysis: An International Journal 36, no. 4 (April 2016): 694–710. doi:10.1111/risa.12362.
The authors of this article recognize the contribution of cyberinfrastructure as an element of the Internet of Things (IoT) to the potential security threats that the international platform faces if limited measures are instituted to address the issue of standardization of norms. When argued from the perspective of game theory the authors recognize the need to understand the essence of strategic interactions between attackers and defenders. The process will be defined by taking into account the physical and cyber components that can be deemed as an explanation or the rationale for their actions.
The article uses the Boolean attack defense model as one of the game theoretical model, which calls for the need to assess the cyber and physical infrastructure to ensure that they are strong enough to defend themselves against any possible attacks. Through such an approach both parties involved in the nuclear strategy as attackers or deference will develop a methodology of balancing their diverse needs in ways that will level the playground. Nuclear imbalance in the view of the authors arises in a situation where one of the parties feels challenged by the prevailing security conditions hence the need to develop improved measures o addressing the underlying challenges. When the probability of attacks is rationalized, it becomes relatively easier to minimize the possibility of building and supporting higher performance network experiments. From this article, it is evident that effective incorporation of game theory in intentional deliberations can be critical in the realization of nuclear stability. The success of this approach depends on the application of the results of simpler models of cloud computing and high-performance infrastructure.
Blank, Stephen. Russia and the Current State of Arms Control / Stephen J. Blank, Editor. SSI
Monograph. Carlisle, PA?: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, 2012. http://165.193.178.96/login?url=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ebscohost.com%2flogin.aspx%3fdirect%3dtrue%26db%3dedsgpr%26AN%3dedsgpr.ocn812463203%26site%3deds-live.
The author of this article recognizes Russia as one of the dominant players in international politics because of its capacity to develop a functional nuclear program since the years of the Cold War. The United States, in an attempt to limit the threat posed by Russia on the nuclear front, has been engaging in arms control activities in its relationship with Russia. According to the author, these measures have been facilitated by the ability of the two countries to identify their inherent responsibility of preventing the possibility of war between them and nuclear proliferation. Arms control as embraced by both the United States and Russia is often aimed at ensuring that nuclear power is not used as a methodology of gaining international dominance and control.
The article will be critical in providing an improved understanding of the contribution of Russia’ military capabilities to the development of arms control relationship with the United States. Through the article, it will also be possible to assess the extent to which the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States has been faced with difficulties of finding common ground on arms control because of lack of goodwill between the two countries on the issue of nuclear proliferation. The issue of regional stability in Eurasia also forms a critical component of this article because it explains the measures that Russia has been taking to establish itself as a regional hegemon despite opposition from the United States.
Farooqui, Aisha D., and Muaz A. Niazi. “Game Theory Models for Communication between
Agents: A Review,” Complex Adapt Syst Model (2017) 4,13. doi:10.1186/s40294-016-0026-7.
The authors of this article recognize the role that game theory plays in enhancing communication and the possibility of arriving at a common ground among international actors on issues of nuclear stability. According to the authors, state actors on the international platform are often involved in constant interactions with the objective of ensuring that their actions are defined by the development of solutions to complex dynamic the define international relations. The article asserts that game theory a perspective of analyzing and modeling the complex dynamics in ways that are considered strategic and beneficial to the players.
The article will be critical for the research process because it integrates the concept of agent-based perspective in game theory when assessing communication between different players on the international platform. In the issue of multilateral nuclear stability, the article recognizes that game theory recognizes the essence of strategic interactions between decision makers by assessing their behavior with the objective of influencing each other. The success of this approach lies in the ability of the agents to manipulate the weaknesses of others in advancing their objectives. When international actors are engaged in communication initiatives game theory recognizes that they must use their power of influence in navigating the complexities that define their interactions.
Blank, Stephen. Russia and the Current State of Arms Control / Stephen J. Blank, Editor. SSI
Monograph. Carlisle, PA?: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, 2012. http://165.193.178.96/login?url=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ebscohost.com%2flogin.aspx%3fdirect%3dtrue%26db%3dedsgpr%26AN%3dedsgpr.ocn812463203%26site%3deds-live.
The author of this article recognizes Russia as one of the dominant players in international politics because of its capacity to develop a functional nuclear program since the years of the Cold War. The United States, in an attempt to limit the threat posed by Russia on the nuclear front, has been engaging in arms control activities in its relationship with Russia. According to the author, these measures have been facilitated by the ability of the two countries to identify their inherent responsibility of preventing the possibility of war between them and nuclear proliferation. Arms control as embraced by both the United States and Russia is often aimed at ensuring that nuclear power is not used as a methodology of gaining international dominance and control.
The article will be critical in providing an improved understanding of the contribution of Russia’ military capabilities to the development of arms control relationship with the United States. Through the article, it will also be possible to assess the extent to which the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States has been faced with difficulties of finding common ground on arms control because of lack of goodwill between the two countries on the issue of nuclear proliferation. The issue of regional stability in Eurasia also forms a critical component of this article because it explains the measures that Russia has been taking to establish itself as a regional hegemon despite opposition from the United States.
Farooqui, Aisha D., and Muaz A. Niazi. “Game Theory Models for Communication between
Agents: A Review,” Complex Adapt Syst Model (2017) 4,13. doi:10.1186/s40294-016-0026-7.
The authors of this article recognize the role that game theory plays in enhancing communication and the possibility of arriving at a common ground among international actors on issues of nuclear stability. According to the authors, state actors on the international platform are often involved in constant interactions with the objective of ensuring that their actions are defined by the development of solutions to complex dynamic the define international relations. The article asserts that game theory a perspective of analyzing and modeling the complex dynamics in ways that are considered strategic and beneficial to the players.
The article will be critical for the research process because it integrates the concept of agent-based perspective in game theory when assessing communication between different players on the international platform. In the issue of multilateral nuclear stability, the article recognizes that game theory recognizes the essence of strategic interactions between decision makers by assessing their behavior with the objective of influencing each other. The success of this approach lies in the ability of the agents to manipulate the weaknesses of others in advancing their objectives. When international actors are engaged in communication initiatives game theory recognizes that they must use their power of influence in navigating the complexities that define their interactions.
Hagemann, Harald, Vadim Kufenko, and Danila Raskov. “Game Theory Modeling for the Cold
War on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain.” History of the Human Sciences 29, no. 4–5 (October 2016): 99–124. doi:10.1177/0952695116666012.
The authors of this article use a historical perspective to understand the approaches that have been used in facilitating the possibility of realizing nuclear stability on the international platform. According to the authors of this article, the formulation and evolution of game theory can be traced to the years of Cold war when the United States and the Soviet Union were focused on the best methodologies of preventing nuclear war while at the same time emerging victorious in their quest for hegemonic power. Both the Soviet Union and the United States developed an individual perspective of the game theory with the objective of inflecting opposing parties to join their initiatives. This explains why confrontations between the two countries were defined by threats because of the fear that any failed attempt would result in the development of negative perception about their capabilities to ensure global security.
The article will be critical for the research process because it will provide an understanding of the contributions of different approaches to the application of game theory towards a multilateral understanding and nuclear stability. Through such an approach it will be relatively easier to understand the essence of a unified approach in which all the players are involved, and their position or power of influence is determined by their ability to generate and implement solutions of the global platform. This is because embracing a division perspective of game theory would threaten the possibility of realizing nuclear stability.
Hoodbhoy, Pervez, and Zia Mian. “Nuclear Fears, Hopes and Realities in Pakistan.”
International Affairs 90, no. 5 (September 2014): 1125–42. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12160.
The authors recognize that it has been four decades since Pakistan launched its nuclear programs and about one and half decades since the country conducted its first nuclear test in 1998. The success of the Pakistan nuclear program has resulted in the thought that Pakistan needs to develop policies that would promote its nuclear program because the bombe would play a critical role in boosting the security of the country from the threat of external attacks. The article recognizes that policymakers have been instrumental in seeking improved methodologies of using its nuclear capacity in resolving the longstanding dispute between the country and India over Kashmir with the hope that Pakistan would emerge victorious. In addition, through effective implementation of its nuclear power, it will be possible for Pakistan to establish itself as a leader in the Gulf region while ushering a new stage in the country’s economic development. Despite this hope, existing evidence indicates that Pakistan has not been successful in actualizing any of its objectives with nuclear power since the condition of the country has been deteriorating.
The articles will be effective in explaining why the feelings of nuclear bomb remain high in Pakistan despite the economic deterioration that the country has been experiencing since the introduction of the nuclear program. In addition, the article will also provide a platform for assessing the issues that must be addressed if Pakistan decides to embrace nuclear disarmament and nuclear restraint.
Tkacik, Michael. “Chinese Nuclear Weapons Enhancements – Implications for Chinese
Employment Policy.” Defence Studies 14, no. 2 (June 2014): 161–91. doi:10.1080/14702436.2014.889471.
The authors of this article use a mainstream analysis to understand the nuclear program that China has been developing with the objective of establishing military dominance in the Asian region and on the global platform. The authors also recognize the interventions of the United States through its counterforce capabilities in the Asian region to be essential contributors to the restraint that Chinese government continues to face in the process of realizing its nuclear objectives. Political analysts can liken the assumptions of the authors to the views from China who perceive the interventions of the United States in the region as an act of minimizing the power that China has been gaining on the economic and social platforms. Denying China an opportunity to excel in the development of nuclear weapons can be perceived as an attempt aimed at limiting the military capabilities of the country.
The article will be essential in understanding the nuclear capabilities of China because it provides an alternative interpretation of the nuclear modernization initiatives that China has been developing to boost its power on the international platform. In addition, the article also provides a platform for examining the essence of approaches such as highly survivable delivery systems and MIRVs in improving the capacity of China to engage effective nuclear weapon design and construction. The warfighting capabilities that China is seeking according to the authors will be critical in boosting China’s military coercion in its endeavors to transition as an international hegemon.
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