The Concept of Covert Action
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Assignment Details
Open Date Sep 21, 2014 12:00 AM
Graded? Yes
Points Possible 100.0
Re-submissions Allowed? No
Assignment Instructions
This is your final assignment. It will evaluate you understanding of policy, you ability to evaluate cases and if you can apply your knowledge to a hypothetical scenario. I have placed some readings in the last lesson that can help you with the questions.
You have three questions to answer. Remember to answer your questions thoroughly and with substance. Do not just say something. Prove to me you know and understand the material by citing all relevant material. Please attach your response, and name your exam as follows: lastname.intl507.finalessay.doc.
Make sure that you review the writing criteria. This is extremely important because effective writing is an important skill for all graduate students. When writing your papers and exams you want to correct for grammar and composition.
You should also consider building an effective organization for all written work. You want to have a good introductory paragraph that conveys your thesis and organization and that provides a summary of your findings. Etc.
Ensure that you use proper citations.
Question 1:
George Kennan authored a policy document—NSC 10/2—that characterized covert action as those activities “so planned and conducted that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them” (Scott and Rosati 2007).
Is this a realistic expectation for any covert action? Meaning, can we really expect the U.S. hand to remain “hidden” even if the action is discovered? If this is not realistic then why continue with the policy of plausible deniability? Or are there measures that can be put in place to make it a continued viable policy?
Question 2:
Compare any two of the cases discussed in the course (except the Bay of Pigs and the Berlin Tunnel). Base your analysis with the questions provided in the “Lecture Notes” for Week 1:
(1) What was the objective of each operation? Was there an overriding policy imperative or were they missions to gain access to the adversary’s information?
(2) What oversight or legal review occurred during their planning?
(3) Who or which organizations were accountable for the operations? What turf issues arose prior to or during the operations?
(4) What resources were necessary to successfully carry them out?
(5) What was the cost/benefit analysis of each operation? Weigh their risks, especially when they are publicly exposed.
(6) In evaluating each operation, what objectives were achieved and what unintended consequences occurred?
Question 3:
Please review this hypothetical situation and indicate (a) whether covert action is appropriate (b) identify the risks and benefits of a covert action (c) identify legal hurdles and (c) decide whether the President should inform all the relevant Congressional intelligence committees or limit knowledge to the “Gang of Eight.” Take into consideration political ramifications and possible blowback.
Concern has built up over Bashar al-Assad’s hold on power and his actions against the Syrian opposition. Through a variety of sources, the CIA believes it has a reliable asset inside the regime that could either organize a coup or “eliminate” the leader. The President has asked you to give him an honest assessment on the possibilities for both.
Answer thoroughly. Make sure to substantiate your responses.
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The Concept of Covert Action
Q.1
The concept of plausible deniability in US intelligence agency
US government has protected the national interest using ways that other governments and the citizens have limited information about. When the Soviet Union wanted to dominate the Middle East by attacking Afghanistan, US government entered into the war to assist Afghans to push Soviet Union outside the country.[1] Additionally, the then prime minister of Iran Mohammad wanted to nationalize the Iranian oil, the US government through their intelligence assisted British government to overthrow Mohammad’s government and instilled their puppet as the prime minister. Finally, the US government is said to have a hand in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba the president of Congo in 1960 since he gained support of the soviet union to resist the force of the political opponents.[2] There other many cases that the use intelligence has participated in other countries’ affairs to gain the interest of the nation in a way that remains silent to the public domain. Therefore, any clandestine way to influence governments, organizations or events of other countries in a silent manner is what is referred to as the covert action. Covert actions are designed by the central intelligence agency to alter foreign economic, political or military reality on total secrecy. As said by Corke, it is the most controversial level of intelligence because on top of its secrecy, it requires lethal force in some cases.[3]
According to US security Act, covert action is “an operation that is planned and executed as to hide the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” In the CIA Act, it is referred to as a special activity, both military and political, which the Government can clearly and legally deny. The CIA is the only branch of security in US that is legally allowed to operate the covert actions. This means that the covert action can be legally denied by the government or the officials even after the exposure of such acts.[4] For example, the assassination of President Patrice Lumumba has been denied by the US government through CIA yet the evidences show their participation in the assassination. All these acts, both good or bad, are done using covert action under plausible deniability that allows them to deny any act the government has done. In this manner, the question is; can US government clearly deny the ill acts that that they have performed and their hands remain clean about the issues? And is this the expectation of the covert actions?
Plausible deniability is the term coined by the Central Intelligence Agency around 1960s to describe the concealment of information from officials to protect them from any repercussions in the events that unpopular and illegal activities by the intelligence become a public knowledge. In espionage and politics, deniability is the ability of authoritative player and intelligence agencies to pass the buck and prevents blowback by furtively and stealthily organizing for an act to be taken on their behalf by another party presumably not connected with the key players. Coleman says that the plausible deniability is a legal concept, which gives the American the right to deny the acts after a covert action.[5] It denotes to the lack of evidence proving a particular allegation. The Standards of proofs always differ in criminal and civil cases. In civil cases, a customary of proof is “preponderance of the evidence” while in a criminal case, the standard is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” If an adversary lacks irrefutable proof of the allegation, one is able to plausibly deny the allegation even if it appears to be the truth
The acts of covert action should be accepted since in most cases, its benefits are realistic if it is intended to assist people. There is no reason why one country wants to nationalize oil so that other countries, which are not producers, continue to suffer. The main argument is that after overthrowing the government and pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan, there is a party that should be responsible and answerable to the public.[6] Therefore, the plausible denial is an act that the US government enacted so that they cannot be questioned if the deal of the covert action goes bad. It is a defensive clause that leaves them clean even after performing unaccepted acts. For example, up to now the US government has not accepted that they had a hand in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba
In this manner, US government should not hide behind the plausible deniability after performing acts that should be answered. Coleman criticizes the government that why do they hold the responsibility when the deal of covert action goes good and deny when it goes bad.[7] Crush says that plausible deniability is an attempt to cheat the public and the target government of the ill actions that the government commits.[8] He says that the government should be responsible for both bad and good achievement it has done. Although Rubin says that nobody should be victimized in a court of law where there is no evidence, in this case, there is evidence that can only be accessed by few individuals in the security agency.[9] Therefore, the government should be answerable and responsible at the end of covert action if the intention of the action is to benefit citizens as said in the act of national security agency.
- 2
Case studies
Covert action of Afghanistan (1979-1089)
Following the Soviet incursion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched the largest covert action in the world history to arm and assist the Afghan resistance. In the next ten years, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and U.S. provided the Afghans with a lot of money, weapons, and supplies, which included advanced anti-aircraft missiles and powerful guns. The armaments and assistance proved a decisive and neutralized Soviet support in the last stages of the conflict and ultimately causing the Soviet Union to come out from Afghanistan.
Operation Ajax of Iran (1953)
In 1951, Iran democratically elected Mohammed Mossadeq Prime Minister, who vied under a platform of nationalizing the Iranian domestic oil industries. At that time, the United Kingdom had a substantial oil interests in Iran through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Soon after the election, Mohammed nationalized the industry of oil, deeply disconcerting the British government. The British government under the then Prime Minister Winston Churchill asked the U.S. government to help him remove Mossadeq from power. Through a chain of covert actions, the CIA of America worked with the U.K Secret Intelligence Services to arrange for the fall of the Mossadeq government and put the Shah as the president of Iran.
Analysis of the case studies
The main objective of the US and other countries was to fight the Soviet Union from Afghanistan was the fear of the dominance of the union in the area. The Soviet Union had one agenda: to increase its borders towards the neighboring countries so as to dominate the area. Being one the petroleum region, the American and other countries such as Saudi Arabia feared the powers of the soviet to control the borders. In early stages, the US government had no main reason as why to fight the soviet through their CIA but only to punish them. American leaders, politicians, Republicans, and Democrats, feared the Soviets were positioning themselves for a takeover of Middle Eastern oil. It is for this reason that the other countries together with US entered to fight for the withdrawal of Soviet Union from the country.
In Ajax operation, the main objective was to remove democratically elected Iranian primes minister who attempted to nationalize the Iran’s oil. The United Kingdom was afraid of the attempt of the prime minister to nationalize the petroleum hence secretively planned on ways to overthrow the government of Mohammad Mossadegh. The US got the interest of the British government following the consequences countries would have after the nationalizing of the petroleum as suggested by the then prime minister. The afghan fighters were defending their government before the soviet came in to support the rivals. In both cases, there was no legal review as the parties wanted to execute their activities with little knowledge of the public and other department of the governments. Davenporta notes that no Americans trained had a direct contact with the mujahedeen.[10]
For Afghanistan, there are several organizations that were accountable for the action. The first one is the Soviet Union who wanted to dominate the area and extends it borders towards the southern part of the country. The afghan of course had to fight back to defend their democratically elected government. The US through their CIA secretively entered into the war by training the Afghans since the dominant of the Soviet Union in the area would threaten the growth of other countries especially when the region was the chief producer of oil. This was the probable turf issue that brought the fight for eviction of soviet forces from Afghanistan. It also included organization such as Britain’s MI and Pakistan secret service known as Inter Service Intelligence. On the other hand, the Ajax operation was dominated by the United Kingdom and the American CIA.[11] The CIA used a number of groups especially the Iranian youths to create a condition in the country that could easily permit a coup operation. The prior issue to this coup problem was the nationalization of the Iranian oil that could threaten the profits of Anglo Iran Oil Company that is now known as BP.
As said by the CIA in their documentary, the Afghanistan covert action is the longest and highly expensive action in their history. Additionally, following the aids from other countries such as Pakistan, Iran, and china, in deed it is the most expensive covert action the global has ever experienced. There was supply of billon of dollars to the afghan militants through the Pakistan secret service, an operation known as operation cyclone. Stanton argues that about $ 3 billion was channeled to the country to equip and train the troops. There were also provision of antiaircraft weapons, stinger missiles that were provided by the countries such United Kingdom and the republic of China.[12] Generally, the covert action of Afghanistan has been very expensive to the US to appoint that there has been senate debate to withdraw American troops from the country. Although the amount of resources used in the Afghanistan covert action is incomparable with Ajax operation, the British government had to use good amount to overthrow Mohammad’s government. The American CIA funded compliable Iranians to pose as communists so as to create an environment of coup activity. The resources were not limited to bribing the local news houses to air propaganda against the then prime minister Cormac reveals that the CIA planned, implemented and funded operation Ajax.[13]
The Ajax operation was to prevent the prime minister from nationalizing oil. The nationalization of oil is unlawful since it prevents privatization of oil from countries that do not produce oil. As much as it was a move to benefit other countries there was other ways of doing it not the coup way. One benefits of the Ajax covert action it that it prevented the nationalization of the petroleum that could pose high prices of oil to all countries globally. Exposure of the covert action of Afghanistan has no risk at all following the dictatorship of the Soviet Union especially when they would have been left to dominate the oil rich countries. A study carried by Stanton reveals that most people were very happy with the American move but as at now very sad with the covert action of America that makes them use most of the government revenues outside the country in military.[14]
One of the main objectives achieved in the Afghanistan covert action is to fight the Soviet Union out of the Middle East. Thus, it has helped in the stabilization of the country and its neighbors. However, there has been revelation that the funds that were used by US government to assist Afghanistan is the major root of militants group such as al Qaeda in the middle east countries. Moreover, the existence of the US troops in Afghanistan up to now is the sole reason that groups such as al-Qaida are against US government. Ajax operation achieved the prevention of nationalization of oil that would see countries that do not produce oil spend a lot on petroleum.
Q.3
Covert action is one of the policies the countries have used to gain national interest. On the other hand, the US has used this technique to protect the citizens in particular war tone areas without physically getting involved.[15] It is for those two main reasons that the covert action becomes very appropriate currently and in future. Following the broad ranges of activities, the covert action has been viewed a useful tool for intelligence that gives room for the third party to get involved in activities of interest.[16] Most used by the white house, convert action has provided results that would have not been gotten if not for the secrecy. In line with the national security act 503 which states that “An activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” Convert actions are put into action because the policies makers believe and know that secret means is the ultimate ways of achieving specific and desired goals.
Following the success of the convert action, it remains appropriate to be incorporated in the intelligence sector of the US. Stanton notes that in a world where every country is greedy for supremacy, certain actions such as diplomacy have narrow chances to solve the interests of the government, hence, intelligence should be used to resolve such issues.[17] For example, the use of covert action in 1954 helped the government to overthrow Lumumba government in Congo in 1961 to prevent the establishment of soviet beachhead that that could interfere with the US economic interest. Although the US government has been accused of applying the convert action areas of their interest, cases have been seen when their interest is to assist affected and unstable governments. For example, the US government has funded The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to eliminate the effects of Al-shabaab militant group currently terrorizing Somali.[18] Therefore, as part the national intelligence, the covert action is appropriate and necessary for individuals and organizations that pose threat to other people and government. In the US congress meeting, the proponents of covert action argued that there is a need for the covert since diplomacy and democracy alone cannot protect the interest and well-being of the US citizens.[19]
One of the main advantages of covert action is in the principle of plausible deniability. This is the principle that is clearly illustrated by the Security Council, which directs the CIA to operate against the groups that pose threat to the interest of the country. As such, it is a mechanism that is used to defend and act on opponents without declaring wars between the countries. It is for the secrecy of the covert action that did not make the soviet group attack US directly when US government cropped in to the war between them and Afghanistan. Converts actions provide the chance to reinforce overt influencing activities to accelerate the prospects of the success. Rubin accentuates that to be successful, convert action form part of large scheme of the foreign policy.[20] It provides an opportunity for the government to get involved in the activities of the target country where overt commitments are not mature because of the situation of the target country. Therefore, it provides an option of silent removal from a particular situation when there is clear evidence that further involvement will not benefit the interest of the country.[21] Generally, the action provides the CIA agency with an excuse to deny the charges and the allegation of involvement in wars between other countries because there is lack of evidence. For example, it is said that the CIA had an upper hand in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the then president of Congo; however, they cannot be victimized since there is lack of evidence.
One of the major risks of the convert action is that it can result to an unending war with opponent country. For example, an attempt to eliminate the al Qaeda militants by the US government turned to be a great war between this group and the US government.[22] The militant group declared a war against US to an extent of bombing properties of US in other countries. The same scenario happens to the states that were assisting Somali to remove Al-Shabaab militant from the country. The militant group is currently terrorizing countries such as Kenya that sent their military to assist Somali. As said by Radsan, another risk of covert action is the potential embarrassment of retaliation against perpetrators of convert action in the case of its disclosure.[23] In the end, the US congress witnesses argued that the government has been habitually embarrassed and criticized domestically and on a global scale as a result of covert actions. Not to forget, convert action ends up in blood shade and sufferings of citizens of the target country. Additionally, the covert action was put in place to protect the president and senior officials in the government to attack other countries without the knowledge of the public and the attacked country, however, if it is exposed it can lead to a serious war.[24] Lastly, there are financial risks both on the side of the target country and the donating country. The US government has used a lot of money on the convert troops and military on covert agendas, thus, the country is risking a lot of money on such acts while other developments remain stagnant in the country.
The legality of covert action has been a matter of discussion. While some people term it as unethical act that should be prohibited, some also criticize it as very illegal. The hurdles of the legality of the covert action has been discussed under the one its operation line known as plausible deniability. Denial plausibility directs that the government has the right to deny the actions when they are exposed in public domain.[25] Hence, questions arise that why would the government deny activities done in accordance with the laws hence it has received legal critics. However, the executive branch of the government has proved this action as legal. The executive order of the US intelligence activities issued on 1981 by President Reagan states that one of the functions of the intelligence is to conduct special activities signed by the president. The section 102d of US intelligence states that “CIA will perform functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security” Thomas Polgar an employee central Congressional committee said in a symposium that covert action exists and it is legal.[26] However, he said that states only need more controls to know when to keep the convert action in good taste accordance to the law. Crush posits that it is not the policies of covert actions that are in doubt, but the keenness and the motivations of individuals implementing and approving the actions.[27] Therefore, it is important to note that the laws of guiding the security in US allows the CIA to conduct special activities such as covet action which makes covert action legal.
The definition of the covert action gives a clear explanation that the act is a secret one hence should involve few individuals as possible. Corke says that one reason why the covert action should involve few people is the characteristic of deniability once it is exposed.[28] The other reason why it should remain secret is the reason that the government participates to fight another country whose actions are not directly affecting the country. Hence, when such information is leaked to have been signed by the government, it portrays a bad image of the country. As such, the president should limit his/her information only to the CIA to avoid political ramifications. Coleman gives an example of good secrecy that led to the death of Osama Bin Laden, which was only known when the US government announced it publicly.[29] Limiting the information to few people leaves room for easy withdrawal when the mission cannot be achieved. The covert action is also defended by plausible deniability that allows the president and the government to deny the allegation if in any case they are exposed to the public.
Bibliography
“Covert Action.” Credo Reference Collections, 2010.
Callanan, James. Covert Action in the Cold War : US Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010.
Coleman, Denise Youngblood. “Foreign Relations.” Iran Country Review, 158. 2013.
Corke, Sarah-Jane. US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy : Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53. London: Routledge, 2008.
Cormac, Rory. “Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency.” Journal Of Strategic Studies 36, no. 5 (October 2013): 692.
Crush, J. S. Covert operations : clandestine migration, temporary work and immigration policy in South Africa / Jonathan Crush. n.p.: Cape Town, 2007.
Davenport, Christian. “Understanding Covert Repressive Action: The Case of the U.S. Government against the Republic of New Africa.” Conflict Resolution, 2005, 120.
Radsan, A. John. “An Overt turn on covert action.” Saint Louis University Law Journal 53, 2009, 485. LexisNexis Academic.
Rubin, Barnett R. Afghanistan From the Cold War Through the War on Terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Stanton, Andrea L. L., et al. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa : An Encyclopedia. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012.
[1] Crush, J. S. Covert operations : clandestine migration, temporary work and immigration policy in South Africa / Jonathan Crush. n.p.: Cape Town, 2007.
[2] Callanan, James. Covert Action in the Cold War : US Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010
[3] Corke, Sarah-Jane. 2008. US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy : Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53. London: Routledge, 2008.
[4] “Covert Action.” (January 1, 2010): Credo Reference Collections
[5] Coleman, Denise Youngblood. 2013. “Foreign Relations.” Iran Country Review, 158.
[6] “Covert Action.” (January 1, 2010): Credo Reference Collections
[7] Coleman, 158.
[8] Crush, J. S. Covert operations : clandestine migration, temporary work and immigration policy in South Africa / Jonathan Crush. n.p.: Cape Town, 2007.
[9] Rubin, Barnett R. Afghanistan From the Cold War Through the War on Terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
[10] Davenport, Christian. “Understanding Covert Repressive Action: The Case of the U.S. Government against the Republic of New Africa.” Conflict Resolution, 2005, 120.
[11] Davenport, Christian. “Understanding Covert Repressive Action: The Case of the U.S. Government against the Republic of New Africa.” Conflict Resolution, 2005, 120.
[12] Stanton, Andrea L. L., et al. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa : An Encyclopedia. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012.
[13] Cormac, Rory. “Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency.” Journal Of Strategic Studies 36, no. 5 (October 2013): 692.
[14] Stanton, Andrea L. L., et al. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa : An Encyclopedia. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012.
[15] Callanan, James. Covert Action in the Cold War : US Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010
[16] Ibid, 34.
[17] Stanton, Andrea L. L., et al. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa : An Encyclopedia. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012.
[18] Stanton, Andrea L. L., et al. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa : An Encyclopedia. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012.
[19] Davenport, Christian. “Understanding Covert Repressive Action: The Case of the U.S. Government against the Republic of New Africa.” Conflict Resolution, 2005, 120.
[20] Rubin, Barnett R. Afghanistan From the Cold War Through the War on Terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
[21] Cormac, Rory. “Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency.” Journal Of Strategic Studies 36, no. 5 (October 2013): 692.
[22] Rubin, Barnett R. Afghanistan From the Cold War Through the War on Terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
[23] Radsan, A. John. “An Overt turn on covert action.” Saint Louis University Law Journal 53, 2009, 485. LexisNexis Academic.
[24] Cormac, Rory. “Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency.” Journal Of Strategic Studies 36, no. 5 (October 2013): 692.
[25] Radsan, A. John. “An Overt turn on covert action.” Saint Louis University Law Journal 53, 2009, 485. LexisNexis Academic.
[26] Crush, J. S. Covert operations : clandestine migration, temporary work and immigration policy in South Africa / Jonathan Crush. n.p.: Cape Town, 2007.
[27] Crush, J. S. Covert operations : clandestine migration, temporary work and immigration policy in South Africa / Jonathan Crush. n.p.: Cape Town, 2007.
[28] Corke, Sarah-Jane. 2008. US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy : Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53. London: Routledge, 2008.
[29] Coleman, Denise Youngblood. 2013. “Foreign Relations.” Iran Country Review, 158.
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